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Abstract 
This study investigates the impact of cheap talk on price in a repeated Bertrand oligopoly 
experiment.  Each participant plays 20 rounds. Participants are placed in three-person bidding 
groups where the lowest bid wins. During the first 10 rounds, participants are not allowed to 
communicate with each other. All three-person groups converged to the zero-profit equilibrium 
in the first 10 periods. We then play another 10 rounds where participants can text with one 
another using an instant message system. Some groups were allowed to text before every round, 
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round, and some to text only every fifth round. When texting is allowed, All groups attempt to 
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higher price and converge over time to the joint-profit maximum are the groups who can text 
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1. Introduction 
Collusion is cooperation that reduces competition in markets. Collusion may harm consumers 
if colluders are able to keep prices above the competitive equilibrium prices: it may harm 
competitors if colluders are able to keep other firms from entering markets. Laws such as the 
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 were passed during a period of increasing monopoly power. For 
example, John D. Rockefeller was building the Standard Oil Trust by buying up oil rights and 
small oil companies in order to control the burgeoning oil market (McGee, 1958). While 
economists generally agree that a true monopoly, such as the Standard Oil Trust, may be able to 
raise prices and earn monopoly profits, there is debate about how many firms are required for 
competition and whether trade organizations that encourage “cheap talk” among competitors are 
anti-competitive (Farrell, 1987; Huck et al., 2004; Horstmann et al., 2018).  
We offer experimental evidence on cheap talk in a repeated Bertrand oligopoly competition. 
Each participant can text with two other participants using an instant message system. We first 
run groups of three subjects through 10 rounds of pricing without allowing cheap talk 
communication. For the second ten rounds we allow some subjects to text before every round, 
some to text before every other round, some to text every third round, some to text every fourth 
round, and some to text only every fifth round.  
We find that all three-person groups converge to the zero-profit equilibrium in the first 10 
periods, when no texting is allowed. On average, all groups attempt to collude to raise the price 
after being allowed to text, but the only groups who can maintain the higher price and converge 
over time to the joint profit maximum are the groups who can text before every period for the 
second set of 10 periods. This is an important new finding about the value of cheap talk. It is 
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only effective when subjects can “continuously monitor” or check in with one another before 
each pricing decision.  
In addition, the more participants discuss the price, the higher the price, and their choices 
significantly affect the market price (winning price). However, participants or groups who 
criticize each other a lot tend to name lower prices and the behavior affects winning prices. The 
impact of individual characteristics on price selection is also notable. On average, women choose 
lower prices than men do, but their pricing behavior does not significantly affect the market 
price. Participants with higher educational achievement choose higher than those with lower 
educational achievement, but their pricing differences do not significantly affect the market 
price. On the other hand, older participants tend to choose lower prices than younger 
participants, but their pricing choices do not significantly affect market prices. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents and summarizes the 
previous articles related to this topic. Section 3 describes how we design the experiment. Section 
4 describes the way we collect the data, the characteristics of the data, and an in-depth analysis 
of the data. Section 5 describes significant findings on pricing behavior. The final section offers 
some concluding statements. 
 
2. Literature Review 
There are three main channels of how communication supports collusion (Fonseca and 
Normann, 2012). Communication helps firms coordinating on a price, removes strategic 
uncertainty, and helps with conflict-mediation to avoid a decline in price. Various forms of 
talking may facilitate price cooperation. The condition of sustaining collusion is satisfied when 
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there is a comprehensive discussion of prices firms will charge, and when there is an adequate 
punishment for noncompliance with pricing agreements (Cason, 2008). In our setting, we use 
cheap talk, which consists of costless, nonbinding, and non-verifiable messages that may affect 
listeners’ beliefs. Farell and Rabin (1996) stress that cheap talk helps to avoid misunderstandings 
and coordination failures; it often improves the outcomes of sellers. Even though there are no 
direct payoff implications in firms’ cheap talk conversations, they may convey some meaning in 
equilibrium. 
Many papers report that companies attempting to coordinate on price meet regularly in real 
life (Genesove and Mullin, 2008; Harrington, 2006). These authors point out that meetings 
among competing firms often lead to cooperation. These meetings allow firms to maintain 
observably higher prices for long periods of time.   The observation that some companies 
succeed in raising prices after meeting with one another encourages other companies to meet to 
discuss prices and monitor compliance with previously discussed prices (Awaya and Krishna, 
2016). Firms meeting to discuss pricing and compliance pose a problem for social welfare and 
efficiency. Firms are assumed to be able to keep prices above competitive equilibrium prices and 
quantities of goods and services sold below competitive equilibrium quantities. The combination 
of higher prices and lower quantities imposes a dead-weight loss on the market, reducing 
efficiency (Posner, 1975; Fisher, 1985; Charness, 2000). 
Previous experiments using other games have shown that communication leads to 
cooperation. Some papers show the impact of communication in a repeated double auction, 
posted offer, and sealed bid-offer market (Isaac and Plott, 1981; Isaac et al., 1984; Isaac and 
Walker, 1985). These studies find that subjects may be able to attain higher profits for some 
periods (collusion), but subjects are not able to sustain those higher profits with repetition. Other 
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papers consider the repeated Hotelling model (coordination on profit-maximizing location 
differences).  Brown-Kruse et al. (1993) and Brown-Kruse and Schenk (2000) study Hotelling 
competition with written communication and report that cheap talk allows participants to earn 
higher profits. 
Crawford (1998) summarizes experimental evidence on communication. He concludes that 
cheap talk is a useful device for firms with repeated interactions to collude on pricing. Holt and 
Davis (1990) use restricted messages and show that nonbinding communication can assist firms 
in raising prices above the competitive equilibrium in posted-offer markets. The messages are 
restricted to price and either agreement or disagreement. Sellers can only write down prices and 
buyers have to choose between agreeing and disagreeing with the posted prices. Cason (1995) 
also studies the potential market impact of non-binding price signals on prices in posted-offer 
markets. He finds that price signals increase market prices in some circumstances but lose their 
impact over time. Cason (2008) finds that increasing the number of communication rounds 
increases the likelihood prices will remain above the competitive market equilibrium price.  
There are a number of studies of Bertrand competition with communication. Using a 
Bertrand duopoly design, Andersson and Wengström (2007) find that costly communication 
decreases the number of messages but enhances the stability of collusive agreements compared 
to no-cost communication. Fonseca and Normann (2012) focus on the effect of the number of 
firms on price in repeated Bertrand oligopolies. Although their goal is to show a negative 
relationship between the number of firms and collusive prices, they also find that texting allows 
firms to set higher prices.  
Some studies focus on free-style communication (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; 
Goeree and Yariv, 2011; Agranov and Tergiman, 2014). However, to our knowledge, there is no 
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systematic study of how much free-style communication is required to maintain price collusion. 
This paper studies repeated Bertrand Oligopoly competition using an instant message system that 
allows participants to send messages without any limitation. We vary the frequency of 
communication allowed. Furthermore, this paper uses Amazon Mechanical Turk subjects 
(MTurk) via the oTree platform (Chen et al., 2016). Most prior experiments above focused on 
laboratory settings with undergraduates, whose decisions and interactions may be different from 
adults in the general public.  
 
3. Experimental Design 
3.1 Outline of Experiment 
We examine Bertrand oligopoly markets with inelastic demand and a constant marginal 
cost of production (Holt et al., 1986). Participants are placed in groups of three according to their 
arrival times. Each participant is endowed with one unit of a hypothetical good each period. The 
goal each period is to sell each unit at the highest possible price in an auction where the lowest 
price wins. Each participant privately sets her or his price between 0 and 100. The lowest price in 
the group wins, and the participant who names the lowest price earns that price as private profit. 
In the case of a tie for the lowest price, the profit is evenly divided among those naming the 
lowest price. The goal of each participant is to earn the highest possible profit. Since each 
participant earns either the lowest price (possibly shared) or 0 as profit, the incentive is to set a 
price lower than either of the participant’s two competitors. Each participant plays this game for 
20 rounds with the same two other participants. The equilibrium of this game is for everyone to 
name a price of 0 and for everyone to earn 0 profit. On the other hand, if subjects can agree on a 
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higher price and actually set that higher price, the profit-maximizing strategy is for every subject 
to set a price of 100 and for each subject to earn 33.3 each period. 
Participants cannot communicate with each other for the first 10 rounds. However, they 
are able to text each other during the second set of 10 rounds (Fonseca and Normann, 2012). The 
frequency of communication varies according to the treatment group to which a participant is 
assigned. There are five treatment groups: texting each round, every other round, every three 
rounds, every four rounds, and every five rounds. Each conversation lasts for 30 seconds, and 
messages are sent through the Instant Messenger (IM) built into the game. The topic of the 
conversation can be anything and does not have to be related to the price. We advise participants 
to protect their own privacy and keep the discussion respectful. Participants also have the right to 
skip the conversation by clicking the “Next” button provided in the IM. The lowest price is 
disclosed to everyone at the end of each round, but the participant who has chosen it is not 
revealed.  
This study was done on Amazon MTurk. The study involves a multi-player game that 
requires simultaneous interactions among participants. We posted recruiting materials on 
MTurker (MTurk workers) communities like turkerview.com, turkopticon.com, and reddit.com. 
The recruitment posts specified the exact date and time of an experiment. Anyone interested in 
this experiment and available at the announced time could submit an email address and MTurk 
ID via an attached link.  
Each group of 3 subjects who arrived at our platform at a designated time and date were 
assigned to a group that would play together for 20 rounds. Each group was assigned to a 
treatment, denoted by the number of conversations allowed during the second 10 rounds of play: 
texting each round (N10), texting every two rounds (N5), texting every three rounds (N4), 
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texting every four rounds (N3), texting every five rounds (N2), and the control groups (N0). 
There were ten groups for each treatment: 180 subjects total. All participants are asked about 
their age, gender, and education level at the beginning of the experiment. We prevented 
participants from joining the same study again by using options on Amazon M-Turk. Completing 
the experiment took 15-25 minutes. Subjects interacted for 20 rounds and each round lasted at 
most 40 seconds. All 20 rounds were played with the same group of 3 individuals.  
Subjects were paid based on a total of 20 rounds of profit. 2000 points were worth $2, 
which was the maximum amount a single participant could earn as a monopolist if 100p = . 
Each participant earned his or her aggregated profit + a $2 completion fee at the end of the 
experiment. If one of the participants in a group left the experiment before the 20th round, the 
price of that player would be automatically set at 100, allowing the remaining 2 players to 
continue playing the game. The participant who failed to complete would be paid based on their 
profit up to that round but would not receive the $2 completion fee. There was no limitation on 
the amount of compensation available to the other two participants.  
3.2 Amazon Mturk and oTree 
This paper includes two crucial features. First, it is run on Amazon Mturk. Amazon 
Mturk is a revolutionary system that connects a large number of Mturkers to requesters. They are 
generally more diverse than student subjects but seem to respond to experimental stimuli in a 
manner consistent with the results of prior research (Cassese et al., 2013; Hoffman, et al., 2020). 
Another important innovation is that the experiment was designed using oTree, an open-
source, online software for implementing interactive online experiments (Chen et al., 2016). 
oTree uses Python, which is an open-source programming language and runs on any device that 
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has a web browser. There are already many demo games and templates available online for 
researchers to use. We used Bertrand competition templates and modified them to run using 
oTree and Amazon Mturk. 
 
4. Data 
The experiments were conducted from July to November in 2019, except for holidays and 
weekends. To conform to the schedules that most MTurk subjects work, the experiments were 
open from 9 AM CT through 8 PM CT, with a new group of 6 subjects starting every 2 hours.  
We restricted participation to U.S. residents using MTurk’s regional restriction system. 267 
subjects started the experiment, but only 180 completed it. We allowed groups with only 1 or 2 
participants to complete the experiment, but we do not include them in the data analysis. We 
continued running groups until we had data for 10 groups of 3 participants in each treatment.  
Table 1 includes more detailed information on the number of subjects in each treatment. 
Although our samples are collected by their arrival time not by stratified random sampling, they 
are well distributed by their characteristics. The subsequent data analyses include only groups of 
3 subjects who completed the experiment.  
Table 2 shows the characteristics of participants who reported their personal information. 
Although not every participant provided his or her personal characteristics, we observe that they 
are randomly assigned to their tasks. Their education levels are (1) High school, (2) Some 
college, (3) Associate degree, (4) Bachelor’s degree, (5) Master’s degree, and (6) Doctoral 
degree. Their average age is 34-40 years old, education level is 2.8-3.6, and the male ratio is 41-
61%.  
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5. Results 
5.1 Simple Analyses 
 Table 3 shows the average payoff by treatment level. Each row represents a treatment 
effect.  N0 is the control group. Compared to N0, all other groups earn higher payoffs on 
average, which means that communication among the three participants is associated with higher 
earnings. Moreover, payoffs to N10 participants are significantly higher than payoffs to 
participants in any other groups (p-value < 0.0001). The N10 group average payoff is nearly 
double the N0 group average payoff. The fact that the participants in the N10 were able to text 
before each of the second 10 rounds may be responsible for the difference.  
 Table 4 presents the average prices by treatment. There are five different treatments and 
a control group in the second 10 rounds. Bid means the average price bid by participants and 
Winning represents the average lowest price in each group. The Pre column shows the average 
price for the first ten rounds, and the Post column shows the average price for the second ten 
rounds. Although there is no significant difference between the pre and post winning prices in 
the N3 and N4 groups, overall we find that the average winning prices are higher in rounds 11-20 
(post) than in rounds 1-10 (pre)  The largest difference between pre-price and post-price is in the 
N10 group. Recall that N10 refers to the treatment in which participants can text before each 
pricing decision made in rounds 11-20. 
 Figure 1 presents the average winning price for all treatments and the control group.1The 
horizontal axis represents the round, and the vertical axis is the average winning price. There is a 
 
1 We also have the median winning price graphs for each group, and they show almost the same result.  
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declining trend for every group in the first ten rounds. What happens in rounds 11-20 depends on 
the frequency of texting. In the control group (N0), the price decline continues, converging 
toward the Nash equilibrium. In Group N2 (texting before rounds 11 and 15), prices rise at 
rounds 11 and 15, but then decline until the next text. In Group N3 (texting before rounds 11, 15, 
and 19) prices increase at those rounds, then fall after. In Group N4, (texting before rounds 11, 
14, 17, and 20) prices rise for each of those rounds and then decrease. In Group N5 (texting at 
rounds 11, 13, 15, 17, and 19) price rises in each of those rounds and declines between. Only in 
N10 (texting before each round from 11-20) are subjects able to maintain an increase in prices, 
converging to a steady-state price of about 90 for the last 5 rounds. The difference between N10 
and the other treatments demonstrates the power of texting before every price decision.  
To investigate whether each group has the same distribution of winning prices, several 
nonparametric tests are used. Table 5 shows the p-values of each test. Each row of Table 5 
reports the p-value of each test comparing the means or the distributions of winning prices. The 
first four rows present the results of the Kruskal-Wallis Equality of population rank test. The 
distribution of winning prices is not equal across treatments and N10 is significantly different 
from the combined distribution of all other groups. This result is statistically significant even 
when we do not restrict the results to only the texting rounds. We find the same results when we 
compare the distribution of winning prices using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. In particular, the 
distribution of the winning prices in N10 is different from the distribution of winning prices in all 
other treatment and control groups. In the first ten rounds (pre-rounds) prices are not 
significantly different; there is no communication allowed in any group. In the post-rounds (11-
20), the distributions are significantly different. The last part of Table 5 includes the Jonckheere-
Terpstra test which is a test for an ascending ordered alternative hypothesis.  It confirms that N10 
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has a significantly higher distribution of winning prices than all other groups combined 
(p<0.0001 for rounds 11-20).  
Table 6 shows the occurrence of cooperation during the experiments: groups that choose 
the same price more than two rounds in a row. Each row represents a group of 3 participants in a 
particular treatment. For example, the last row says that there is a group in treatment N10 who 
texts 10 times and agrees on a price of 99 for 5 rounds in a row and then 99 for another 4 rounds 
in a row. Note that with 3 participants, a price of 99 split 3 ways gives each participant a profit of 
33.  There are 24 examples of collusive behaviors:  three in N0, five in N2, two in N3, three in 
N4, five in N5, and five in N10. The average length of rounds of collusion is 5, 3.6, 5, 2.6, 5.6 
and 6.1 rounds, respectively. These results show that N10 is associated with longer collusive 
sequences of rounds and higher collusive prices.  
5.2 Regression 
Our equations are estimated in the form 
pij = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑛𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑛𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗 
pij = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑛𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽2𝑛𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗 
where pij is the bid/winning price of individual i in round j. 𝑛𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡 is the level of 
treatment that is equal to the number of texting rounds that participants in the same group 
experience. Post is a dummy variable equal to 1 when j > 10. Texting is also a dummy variable 
which is equal to 1 if the number of a round is equal to their designated texting round. 
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Composition of Text variables are the proportion of statements regarding Price and Denunciation 
from the whole round, respectively. We omit Others to prevent multicollinearity. Individual 
characteristics include participant's sex, age, and education level. If cheap talk is effective, the 
more texting rounds allowed in the post-period, the higher the average prices.  
Regressions supplement the above descriptive analyses. Table 7 includes the main 
regression result with Age, Sex, and Education Dummies. We exclude from the regression 
participants who do not report their characteristics. In columns (1)-(2), the coefficients of  nText 
(-2.188) and Post (-12.18) are both negative and significant. Although it is a random experiment, 
there is a negative relationship between nText and prices in the first ten rounds. Furthermore, 
prices are lower without texting in the second ten rounds compared to the first ten rounds. If we 
interact nText and Post (nText#Post) the coefficients for bids (+ 6.348) and winning prices (+ 
6.581) are both positive and significant. It shows that the more texting opportunities a group is 
given, the higher their bids and the higher their winning prices. 
  Columns (3)-(4) use Texting instead of Post. The coefficients of 𝑛𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡 and Texting 
show the average differences between the control group and the treated groups. The coefficients 
of the interaction term (nText#Texting) for bids (+ 6.262) and winning prices (+ 7.039) are 
significantly positive, indicating significantly higher prices and winning bids in the treatment 
groups compared to the control group in the communication rounds.  
The next row in Table 7 introduces a variable Price(%), which indicates the percentage of 
rounds a participant texts about price. On average, the participants who text more about price 
choose significantly higher prices, and in fact, help their groups achieve significantly higher 
winning prices. The coefficient for Price(%) is + 8.725 for bids and +10.15 for winning prices in 
columns (1)-(2), which shows a larger effect in columns (3)-(4). Interestingly, the coefficient for 
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women is negative and significant for bids, but insignificant for winning prices. The coefficient 
for age is negative and significant for bids and insignificant for winning prices; and the 
coefficient for education is positive and significant for bids and insignificant for winning prices. 
Putting these coefficients together, on average older less educated women bid less and younger 
more educated men bid more, but those bids do not on average significantly affect winning 
prices. 
5.3 End-game effect 
 At the end of each round participants are told how many rounds they have left. Knowing 
how many rounds remain raises the question of whether participants stop cooperation at the 20th 
round (End-game effect). Among our 50 treated groups, we find five groups that include at least 
one participant who chooses a little lower price than the agreed price. There are two N2 groups 
and three N10 groups. Intuitively, 10% seems a relatively small number compared to the 
conventional wisdom that many people would deviate at the last round. However, participants 
who demonstrate an end-game effect achieve a higher average payoff (393.5 compared to others’ 
238), and the difference is statistically significant (t=12.13). Furthermore, their groups’ average 
winning prices across all rounds are higher than others (52.45 compared to 34.96, t =9.8). That 
implies that groups with betrayers have worked well before the 20th round. But participants who 
choose a lower price at the end get a higher individual payoff by breaking that long-term trust.  
5.4 Texting Logs 
Figure 2 shows examples of texts of groups who earn the lowest and the highest payoffs. 
The top box illustrates texts by the group that earns the lowest payoff. The lowest average treated 
group payoff is 49 points for one 3-person observation in treatment N4. An analysis of the texts 
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shows that only player 1 participates in the conversation, and no one replies. No communication 
leads them to the lowest group payoff. They can do better if they all cooperate on choosing a 
price. The highest average group payoff is 483.66 for a 3-participant observation in treatment N4 
(Figure 2 box 2). This observation also includes the participant (P1), who earns the highest 
overall payoff (627). Every participant text every texting round to get a higher payoff at the end.  
The highest average group payoff is almost ten times the lowest average group payoff. 
The additional profit each firm generates from participating in cheap talk is large. This result 
confirms that cheap talk before every pricing decision is a useful method to reach a collusive 
outcome. Although the communication cost is zero and the number of participants is small in our 
settings, we provide a fundamental background for explaining a cartel. The gap is so wide that 
firms in an industry are likely to establish a cartel if they can engage in cheap talk without 
restriction.  
We further divide the comments into three groups: Price, Denouncement, and others. 
Table 8 reports that more than 60% of the texting is about price. This shows the important 
finding that people naturally discuss price even when there are no guidelines or restrictions. The 
fact that only one of the treated groups does not discuss price at all shows that people want to 
discuss price. Furthermore, it is interesting that participants in our experiments try to follow or 
trust each other without any sanctions or coercion. Figure 3 illustrates some denouncing 
statements from various groups. Overall, we observe a number of statements denouncing 
participants who have broken agreements. However, we do not observe participants who post 
such threatening conversations and then post lower prices. 
6. Conclusion and Discussion 
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This paper presents the results of an experimental test of repeated Bertrand oligopolies 
with freestyle texting (cheap talk). This study compares different pricing behaviors between the 
first 10 rounds and the second 10 rounds, where participants can text in the second 10 rounds. 
We find that market prices are higher in texting rounds than in non-texting rounds. Furthermore, 
texting before choosing price every round results in close to monopolistic prices and 
significantly higher prices than even texting every other round. We also find that women, older 
participants, and less educated participants tend to choose lower prices, but these different 
pricing behaviors do not significantly affect market prices. 
Even though participants can communicate anything in texts, they focus on price. We 
have only one treated group that does not discuss price. This result confirms a commonsense 
notion that increasing the number of communications in a market leads to a collusive outcome. 
Communication works as a mediator and proctor.  
Cason (1995) points out that the modes of communication have kept pace with available 
technology, going from face-to-face exchanges to telephonic exchanges to computer exchanges. 
We use Amazon Mturk and an Instant Message system so that participants can represent the 
whole population and easily share their words. The experiment is an abstraction from reality, but 
it supports the argument that firms are able to fix prices through non-binding conversations. This 
experiment helps initiate an antitrust investigation. The fact that competitors hold a meeting is 
sufficient information to presume they are trying to collude. It is not necessary to analyze the 
conversations at their meeting.  
Our future research question is to investigate the effect of face-to-face communications, 
such as Facetime, Skype, or Zoom, instead of texting. Face-to-face communication is more 
dynamic and fluid with verbal and facial expressions. Such communication also allows 
17 
 
individuals to more accurately address important issues and concerns (Balliet, 2010). Moreover, 
there is experimental evidence that face-to-face discussion further increases cooperation 
(Hoffman and Spitzer, 1982, 1985, 1986; Bochet et al., 2006; Baranski and Kagel, 2015). 
 A limitation of this experiment is that we could not control the participants’ previous 
experiences playing economic games. Although we limit them to play only once in our 
experiment, it would also be helpful to know whether some participants have more experience 
playing economic games than others. Such an experience might affect the results.   
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Table 1 Number participants by treatment 
  
Number of participants in 
each group 
  
  1 2 3 Total 
N0 0 6 30 36 
N2 5 16 30 51 
N3 2 14 30 46 
N4 4 10 30 44 
N5 0 6 30 36 
N10 4 20 30 54 
   Note: We exclude groups of 1 and groups of 2 in our analysis. 
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Table 2 Characteristics of Participants 
N0       N2      
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Age 25 39.64 13.87 19 69  Age 22 35.59 10.62 24 69 
Education 25 2.80 1.35 1 5  Education 22 3.55 1.26 1 6 
Male 25 0.56 0.51 0 1  Male 22 0.50 0.51 0 1 
             
N3       N4      
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Age 22 33.77 9.78 22 58  Age 22 38.59 12.27 19 71 
Education 22 3.18 1.05 1 4  Education 22 3.05 1.25 1 5 
Male 22 0.59 0.50 0 1  Male 22 0.41 0.50 0 1 
             
N5       N10      
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Age 23 36.78 10.77 23 64  Age 28 34.39 11.01 19 60 
Education 23 2.91 1.28 1 5  Education 28 3.43 1.29 1 6 
Male 23 0.57 0.59 0 2  Male 28 0.61 0.50 0 1 
Note: This tables exclude participant who does not report their characteristics. 
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Table 3 Average payoff by number of texting rounds 
  Mean SD Min Max 
N0 162.76 110.37 4 348 
N2 249.95 128.91 48 520 
N3 218.86 151.88 0 492 
N4 216.05 138.55 26 627 
N5 238.7 133.5 32 446 
N10 309.21 123.99 55 506 
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Table 4 Average bid and winning price by the number of texting rounds: pre denotes first 10 
rounds and post denotes rounds 11-20 
N0     N2    
Variable Pre Post Diff   Variable Pre Post Diff 
Bid 43.3 37.02 -6.277**   Bid 42.44 47.08 4.637** 
 [1.70] [1.87] [2.530]    [1.56] [1.76] [2.348] 
Winning 25.41 21.24 -4.170***   Winning 29.12 40.15 11.030*** 
 [0.88] [1.20] [1.489]     [1.15] [1.67] [2.025]  
N 300 300 600   N 300 300 600 
         
N3     N4    
Variable Pre Post Diff  Variable Pre Post Diff 
Bid 49.25 51.04 1.797  Bid 51.28 44.92 -6.367** 
 [1.63] [1.97] [2.551]   [1.86] [1.68] [2.503] 
Winning 33.98 37.28 3.3  Winning 31.46 31.7 0.24 
 [1.14] [1.77] [2.104]   [1.14] [1.32] [1.748] 
N 300 300 600  N 300 300 600 
         
N5     N10    
Variable Pre Post Diff   Variable Pre Post Diff 
Bid 42.77 53.88 11.110***   Bid 26.35 83.51 57.160*** 
 [1.74] [2.06] [2.696]    [1.34] [1.81] [2.256] 
Winning 27.31 43.44 16.130***   Winning 15.6 77.07 61.470*** 
 [1.13] [2.03] [2.326]    [0.66] [2.10] [2.199] 
N 300 300 600   N 300 300 600 
Significance levels:    * < 10%    ** < 5%    *** < 1% 
    
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 5 Average winning price by the treatment group 
 By Period P-value 
Kruskal-Wallis Equality of population rank test Number of texts Whole 0.0001 
 Number of texts Only post 0.0001 
 All others vs N10 Whole 0.0002 
 All others vs N10 Only post 0.0001 
Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test N2 vs N10 Whole 0.0315 
 N3 vs N10 Whole 0.2374 
 N4 vs N10 Whole 0.0728 
 N5 vs N10 Whole 0.1010 
 N0 vs N10 Whole <0.0001 
 N2 vs N10 Only post <0.0001 
 N3 vs N10 Only post <0.0001 
 N4 vs N10 Only post <0.0001 
 N5 vs N10 Only post <0.0001 
  N0 vs N10 Only post <0.0001 
Jonckheere-Terpstra Test for Ordered Alternatives All others vs N10 Whole 0.0001 
 All others vs N10 Only post <0.0001 
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Table 6 Occurrence of Collusion 
  
Number of 
rounds  
Price 
N0 2 5 
N0 9 5 
N0 4 30 
N2 5,5 50,100 
N2 2,3 50,80 
N2 2 10 
N2 2 60 
N2 6,4 45,100 
N3 6 100 
N3 4 95 
N4 4 45 
N4 2 100 
N4 2 10 
N5 10 50 
N5 2 100 
N5 4 100 
N5 2 100 
N5 10 100 
N10 9 100 
N10 9 100 
N10 10 100 
N10 5,9 50,100 
N10 2,2 50,100 
N10 5,4 99,99 
 
  
28 
 
Table 7 Regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Bid Winning Bid Winning 
     
nText -2.188*** -1.718*** -2.127*** -1.775*** 
 (0.211) (0.135) (0.203) (0.142) 
Post -12.18*** -11.21***   
 (1.709) (1.341)   
Post # nText 6.348*** 6.581***   
 (0.313) (0.280)   
Texting   -9.326*** -13.54*** 
   (3.329) (3.112) 
Texting # nText   6.261*** 7.039*** 
   (0.455) (0.448) 
Price (%) 8.725*** 10.15*** 12.86*** 14.79*** 
 (1.535) (1.291) (1.512) (1.257) 
Denunciation (%) -12.72* -20.66*** -3.617 -10.43* 
 (6.799) (5.164) (6.956) (5.391) 
Age -0.190*** -0.0381 -0.200*** -0.0493 
 (0.0506) (0.0404) (0.0499) (0.0394) 
Female -3.861*** -0.239 -3.560*** 0.1000 
 (1.142) (0.977) (1.139) (0.975) 
Education 1.571*** 0.262 1.492*** 0.174 
 (0.449) (0.378) (0.446) (0.378) 
Constant 46.03*** 27.81*** 43.82*** 26.57*** 
 (2.644) (1.997) (2.545) (1.901) 
     
Observations 2,840 2,840 2,840 2,840 
R-squared 0.205 0.297 0.215 0.306 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8 Composition of Texting by treatment 
  
  Price Denouncement Others 
N2 83% 1% 5% 
N3 61% 1% 28% 
N4 66% 2% 26% 
N5 64% 9% 21% 
N10 81% 3% 16% 
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Figure 1 Average winning price by the treatment group 
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Figure 2 Texting log from the experiments 
Box1 
 
Box2 
 
 
 
 
 
  
P1: Ok, so let’s just all sell it for 95 and we all win? Deal? 
P1: Stop being so selfish!!!! 
P1: If we work together, we all make more bonus.. 
P3: Lets go 70! 
P1: Okay 
P2: ok 
—— 
P3: Can we go up to 90? 
P1: go to 80? 
P3: why not go all in? 
P1: okay 
P2: ok 
—— 
P3: So wait, what if all prices are equal? lets go 100 
P1: ok 
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Figure 3 Denouncing text from several groups 
 
well...someone's not in agreement 
clearly someone doesn't care what we discuss 
who was doing 10?  
i hate you 
Stop being so selfish!!!! 
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